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Abstract
We investigate the impact of corporate taxation on capital stock. In the paper,
we indicate that corporate taxation might not only distort the decision of each ﬁrm
to invest but could also destroy ﬁrms. With this in mind, we estimate capital de-
mand equations, correcting for self-selection in the decision to produce by using the
Heckman-Lee method and its panel data counterpart (Kyriadizou method). We use
Chileanplant-leveldata, whichisaperiodwithlargevariabilityincorporatetaxation.
We ﬁnd that corporate taxation has a considerable impact on the creation-destruction
of ﬁrms and in addition, it also has an important impact on the decision of how much
to invest for ﬁrms that are already involved in production.
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The impact of corporate tax on capital accumulation has been extensively analyzed in
the economic literature since the seminal contributions of Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jor-
genson (1967) and Tobin (1969). The two main arguments by which corporate taxation
should affect capital stock in the long run are the following. On the one hand, a larger
corporate tax rate decreases the future after-tax marginal product of current investment,
producing a substitution effect towards larger current proﬁts and thus depressing invest-
ment(Jorgenson (1963)). 1 On the other hand, since capital stock investments are tax-
deductible, the negative effect of the corporate tax on capital stock might be offset at least
partially by tax deductions arising from depreciation or debt and interest-rate payments.
The above arguments are generally obtained from the case of a representative ﬁrm
that maximizes its future expected proﬁts. In this paper, we complement this view, by
considering the ﬁrms´ decision to enter or exit the market such that corporate tax may
affect the creation and destruction of ﬁrms. In that case, the corporate tax may impact
capital stock by two main channels: (i) the intensive margin effect which corresponds to
the impact on ﬁrms that are in production and will continue producing - these are the
arguments stated above- and (ii) the extensive margin effect which corresponds to the
possibility that a larger corporate tax rate might lower ﬁrms’ after-tax proﬁts, providing
incentives to ﬁrms to exit the market and not invest at all. This second channel is a type
of corner solution in investment decisions that results from the extensive margin impact
of the corporate taxation, i.e. ﬁrms exiting the productive market.
Note that in the traditional context in which there is a unique ﬁrm that does not exit
the production market, the estimation of the traditional investment equation provides
the marginal impact of an increase in corporate taxation on the ﬁrm’s investment. How-
ever, in the context of heterogeneous ﬁrms facing outside options and the possibility of
exiting the production market, the estimation of the same structural regression might be
biased. In fact, if ﬁrms self-select in their decision to enter or exit the production market,
conditional on the corporate tax rate, then the sample selection will provide inconsistent
estimates of our impacts of interest.
Our paper tests for this transmission channel and its potential importance using panel
data of Chilean ﬁrms during the period 1979-2004. To highlight the importance of ﬁrm
1A similar argument follows from the Tobin’s model in which a larger corporate tax rate reduces the after-
tax market value of business capital assets and, thus, lowers both Tobin’s q and investment.
1selection we initially provide estimates of simple OLS and panel data models that do
not account for selection and later take account of the entry-exit decision by using the
two-step Heckman method (Heckman (1974), Heckman (1976), Heckman (1979)), and the
Kyriazidou panel data selection procedure (Kyriazidou (1997)).
Our data is interesting to our exercise due to different reasons. First, it consists of
a detailed panel of ﬁrms in the Chilean manufacturing sector during the period 1979 to
2000 which is quite an interesting period concerning corporate taxation in Chile due to a
large ﬁscal reform that took place in 1984. The aim of the reform was to remove potential
distortions that were depressing savings and investment. The reform focused on income
taxes. Before 1984, ﬁrms were taxed by a corporate tax that was set at 10% plus an ad-
ditional tax of 40% on after-corporate-tax proﬁts. In total, ﬁrms paid a 46% tax on their
proﬁts. Individuals were allowed to reduce the 40% tax if they received ﬁrm’s dividends
from their tax base. The 1984 reform eliminated the additional 40% tax on after-corporate-
tax proﬁts, which produced a signiﬁcant decrease in overall corporate tax rate. In 1990,
this tax scheme was modiﬁed by establishing different tax rates for distributed and undis-
tributed proﬁts, the tax rate being 10% in the case of distributed proﬁts and 0% in the case
of undistributed. This differentiated scheme was eliminated in 1991 when the corporate
tax rate was set at 10%. In 1992, the corporate tax rate increased to 15% and in 2004 it
was increased to 17%. Second, we have available detailed data on the effective amount of
corporate taxes paid by ﬁrms which provides us with a measure of the effective corporate
tax rate when including tax deductions and potential tax evasion. In addition, our data
set contains a large fraction of small ﬁrms that are more likely to be destroyed when the
economic environment becomes more stringent, as could be the case of a large corporate
tax rate.
In this paper, we ﬁnd that if we do not correct for self selection, the coefﬁcient of
corporate tax in the intensive margin decision is generally not signiﬁcant. However when
we correct for self selection, the intensive margin impact is economically signiﬁcant, as
we ﬁnd that a 1% increase in corporate tax might depress capital stock accumulation by
between 1 and 2%. We also ﬁnd that the impact of corporate taxation on a ﬁrm’s decision
to become involved in production is large; in fact our estimates indicate that a 1% increase
in corporate tax rate might depress the participation of ﬁrms by almost 1.2% .
This paper is developed in the following way. Section (2) discusses related studies
on corporate taxation, ﬁrm destruction and business investment. Section (3) provides a
theoretical model of business investment when ﬁrms may exit production and provides
2a testable equation for desired capital stock in this case. Section (5) describes the data
while sections (4) and (6) explain the methodology and discuss the results. Section (7)
concludes.
2 Related Literature
The empirical literature on the relationship between tax policy and capital stock is ex-
tensive and contains mixed evidence as to whether or not changes in tax policy does not
affect investment expenditure.
The study of investment builds mainly on the work of Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin
(1969). Whilethe theoreticalstudies developed inthe neoclassical veinof Jorgenson(1963)
proved useful in developing a conceptual framework, their empirical validation is more
controversial and many times outperformed by ad-hoc empirical models.
The work of Tobin (1969) is closely related to the neoclassical theory of Jorgenson
(1963). In his framework, the investment rate depends on the ratio of the market value
of business capital assets to their replacement value which is usually known as q. In this
case, a larger corporate tax rate reduces the after-tax market value of business capital as-
sets and, thus, lowers both q and investment. This model has been estimated using least
squaresonaggregatedata(eg., Summers, Bosworth, Tobin, andWhite(1981))orapanelof
ﬁrms (eg., Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, and Poterba (1988)). Estimations typically
assume there is some adjustment cost in the investment function, generally written as a
quadratic functional form. Empirical results are rarely consistent with these theoretical
assumptions. This ﬁnding may reﬂect a rejection of the q-theory, the existence of q mea-
surement error, an indication of negative correlation between adjustment costs and tax
adjusted q, or just a rejection of the assumed quadratic functional form. Further, it must
be noticed that tax-adjusted q explains investment somewhat better than q by itself, espe-
cially for the dramatic tax adjustments associated with corporate-income-tax-law changes
(eg., Cummins, Hasset, and Hubbard (1995)). This, in turn, may suggest that the q mea-
surement error is serious enough that the effect of q on investment is best detected when
the tax adjustment is more dramatic than the measurement error. See Chirinko (1993) and
more recently Hasset and Hubbard (2002) for discussions on this issue.
Our work is more related to the one of Jorgenson (1963) as we estimate capital demand
based on the user cost theory. We extend the usual approach by allowing entry and exit
of ﬁrms as it will be explained later.
3Our work is also related to the literature on creative destruction which is extensive
in theoretical and empirical contributions. Several papers ﬁnd that plants’ entry and exit
decisions play a signiﬁcant role in the process of reallocation, see Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2001) for a detailed discussion. For example, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996) ﬁnd entry and exit explain 20 percent of job destruction and 15 percent of job cre-
ation. Other studies (e.g. Olley and Pakes (1996) and Dwyer (1995)) report that productiv-
ity is important for explaining exit, such that ﬁrms with low productivity levels are more
likely to exit even after controlling for other factors as size and age. In our paper we ana-
lyze the entry and exit of plants in order to study their joint investment and participation
decisions presenting evidence related to these studies.
Studies of investment and corporate taxation in Chile are recent. Hsieh and Parker
(2007) argue that corporate tax reform was a signiﬁcant and direct cause of Chile´s invest-
ment boom. Bustos, Engel, and Galetovic (2004) study the investment process using an
annual panel of 83 ﬁrms, with data ranging from 1985 to 1995, and report no signiﬁcant
impact of the corporate tax rate on the long run capital stock. Vergara (2008) investigates
empirically the link between the income tax reform in the 1980s and Chile´s investment
performance since the reform using macro data. Cerda and Larraín (2005) contribute in
analyzing corporate taxation and investment in small, medium and large ﬁrms.
Our paper re-examines the evidence on corporate taxation and the ﬁrm’s investment
from a different perspective. While the papers generally focus on an intensive margin
effect, i.e. the impact of corporate taxation on investment of ﬁrms involved in production,
they do not consider potential extensive margin effects, i.e. the potential destruction of
ﬁrms due to higher corporate taxes. This is obviously a dimension that is of considerable
concern, even if there is no impact on the intensive margin. In addition, the exclusion
of the selection decision (between being involved in production or exiting the market)
in the empirical studies might bias the coefﬁcients of the intensive margin effects of the
different variables considerably. This bias might occur as our data set includes ﬁrms that
self-select into production and in which the selection decision depends on some of the
variables considered in the intensive margin decision, such as the case of the corporate
tax. Our paper extends the analysis in this direction. That line of work is related to the
study by Pratap and Rendon (2003) in which they estimate a dynamic structural model
of ﬁrms’ investment, allowing for borrowing constraint and ﬁrms exit, using data from
the Standard and Poor Industrial Compustat database. In contrast to that study, our work
focuses on the impact of corporate taxation on ﬁrms’ desired capital stock and we use
4data from a developing country.
3 The model and estimable equation
3.1 Setup
In this section, we sketch a model of ﬁrm’s investment in which we allow for ﬁrm exit
with the objective of motivating the empirical analysis in section (4). The model, similar
to Chavas (1994) and Hayashi (1982), is a partial equilibrium model as ﬁrms face interest
and wage rates.
Consider the case of a ﬁrm i that maximizes its net receipts which are written as after-







Rs f(1 ¡ ¿t)[F(ki;t;li;t;²i;t) ¡ wtli;t] ¡ (ptIi;t)g
where ¿t is the government corporate tax proﬁts; F(kit;lit;²i;t) is the production func-
tion the ﬁrm has available; kit is the capital stock; li;t is labor; wt is the wage rate which is
common to all ﬁrms; Ii;t is investment. The price of capital goods is denoted with pt while
²i;t is an iid shock.
We assume that F(ki;t;li;t;²i;t) exhibits decreasing returns to scale and is strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes Inada conditions on ki;t and li;t. Also F(ki;t;li;t;²i;t)
is linear homogeneous in both inputs and F(0;li;t;²i;t) = 0; 8li;t. This last assumption
indicates that a ﬁrm holding zero units of capital produces zero output.
Firm heterogeneity arises from the parameter ²i;t, which is distributed across ﬁrms
withprobabilitydensityfunctionµ(²i;t), cumulativedistribution£(²i;t)andsupport[²l;²u],
where 0 < ²l < ²u < 1. Finally capital stock evolves according to:
ki;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t + Ii;t
The ﬁrm’s problem can be resumed by the following dynamic programming problem:
5Vt(ki;t;²i;t) = max
li;t;Ii;t





ki;t+1 = Ii;t + (1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t
Ii;t ¸ ¡(1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t
where Vt(ki;t;²i;t) is the value of holding kit units of capital at time t which depends on
the shock ²it. We have placed restrictions on investment by including a lower bound that
corresponds to the maximum amount of capital available after depreciation and therefore
corresponds to the case of an idle ﬁrm. Also, Di;t(Ii;t) is an indicator function equal to
one if Ii;t > ¡(1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t and equal to zero when the ﬁrm decides to close, i.e. Ii;t =










< pt if Ii;t = ¡(1 ¡ ±i;t+1)ki;t (3)
Equations (2) to (3) show the marginal beneﬁt from accumulating capital stock vis-µ a-
vis the marginal cost. Equation (2) shows that in the case of a ﬁrm that decides to invest,
the marginal beneﬁt is the impact on the expected discounted future value of the ﬁrm,
while its marginal cost is the price of the investment. Equation (3) shows the condition
that determines that a ﬁrm sells out the available capital stock. The associated envelope
condition of this problem is:
±Vt (ki;t;²i;t)
±ki;t
= (1 ¡ ¿t)Fk(ki;t;li;t;²i;t) + pt(1 ¡ ±) (4)
2The optimality condition with to respect to labor is:
[li;t] Fl(ki;t;li;t) = wt
6We plan to obtain an estimable equation of the desired stock of capital as a function of
the components of the user cost of capital. Following Bustos, Engel, and Galetovic (2004),
we assume a CES production function, where we set ²i;t as the distribution parameter and
where ¾ > 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution of the ith ﬁrm at time t. Further, using
(2) to (4), we obtain the following estimable equation:
ln(ki;t+1) = log(Yi;t+1) ¡ ¾¿i;t+1 ¡ ¾ln(±i;t + ri;t) + ¾ln(²i;t+1) if Ii;t > ¡(1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t
(5)
ki;t+1 = 0 if Ii;t = ¡(1 ¡ ±i;t)ki;t (6)
Equation (5) corresponds to a capital demand equation for ﬁrms that self-select into
production3. If the ﬁrm decides to close, it sells out its remaining capital stock while if
it remains in production, it determines its capital demand according to its scale of pro-
duction and the components of the user cost of capital. Note that the fraction of ﬁrms
involved in production is:

























In this scenario, corporate taxation has two impacts: (1) it impacts the investment deci-
sion of each ﬁrm involved in production (intensive margin) and (2) it impacts the fraction
of ﬁrms involved in production (extensive margin). In fact, an increase in corporate taxa-















where ¾² is the standard deviation of ln(²i;t). The impact on equation (8) corresponds
3In equation (5), we use the approximation ln(1 ¡ ¿i;t+1) ¼ ¡¿i;t+1.
4Where we assume a constant investment price, pt.
7to the marginal effect of corporate taxation on the extensive margin decision while ¡¾ in
equation (5) corresponds to the marginal impact of corporate taxation on business invest-
ment, conditional on the ﬁrm being involved in production.
4 Methodology
In this section, we explain the methodology used to estimate the model developed in sec-
tion (3). In the spirit of the above discussion, we consider a model characterized by three
main equations. The ﬁrst equation, see (9) below, corresponds to a ﬁrm’s capital demand
function when it is involved in production. In this case, corporate taxation affects the
ﬁrm’s extensive margin investment decision. The second and third equations -equations
(10) and (11)- relate to the ﬁrm’s participation decision: this is the decision concerning
whether the ﬁrm remains idle or the ﬁrm engages in production. Equation (10) explains
the behavior of a latent index, d¤
i;t, which determines the ﬁrm’s extensive margin decision.
In our notation i indexes ﬁrms while t indexes years. We will assume that the latent index
is not observable. Instead, the econometrician observes an indicator function dit which is
equal to one when the ﬁrm decides to produce and zero if it closes. Equation (11) shows




i;t) = xi;t¯ + ®i + ¹i;t; i = 1;::;N; t = 1;:::;T (9)
d¤
i;t = zi;t° + ´i + ui;t (10)
di;t = 1(zi;t° + ´i + ui;t ¸ 0) (11)
Since our data corresponds to a panel of ﬁrms starting in 1979, we allow potential in-
dividual ﬁxed effects in (9) to (11). Also we allow additional factors -the control variables
(xit;zit) - that might affect the ﬁrm’s decisions concerning the intensive and extensive
margin. These control variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous and may contain
common elements while (¹i;t;ui;t) are unobserved disturbances and (®i;´i) are individ-
ual effects per ﬁrm.
Our goal is to estimate the parameters (¯;°) consistently, speciﬁcally the parameters
corresponding to the impact of corporate taxation. When estimating the model we may
face sample selection bias. The sample selection arises because we observe investment
8decision only for ﬁrms involved in production, which means that we observe ln(ki;t
¤)
only when di;t = 1. This characteristic poses a probable selection bias in our estimators
if we estimate by traditional least-squares methods or traditional panel data methods. In
fact, ﬁrms with larger capital accumulation are typically more productive, and thus more
likely to be involved in production. As a result, unobservable controls would inﬂuence
both the investment margin and the extension margin equations, probably producing bias
in our estimates if we do not consider the selection problem.
To address this problem we follow two procedures. Firstly, we follow the methodol-
ogy elaborated by Heckman (Heckman (1974), Heckman (1976)) and Lee (Lee (1978)) to
correct selectivity bias. The identiﬁcation of our parameter is based on two main assump-
tions: (1) there are no individual ﬁxed effects by pooling our data and (2) there is at least
one instrument available to estimate the participation equation. Secondly, to address the
panel structure of our dataset we follow the procedure elaborated by Kyriazidou (1997)
and applied by Charlier, Melenberg, and van Soest (2001) and Askildsen, Baltagi, and
Holmas (2003) among others to other economic questions. In this case, and by contrast to
the Heckman-Lee methodology, we allow ﬁxed effects and we control for their potential
correlation with the error term or the exogenous variables.
We will present estimates using both methods to test whether there is consistency in
our results under different assumptions. While we are able to provide estimates of the
selection equation and the intensive margin equation, in both procedures the methodol-
ogy differs. As indicated above, under the Heckman-Lee procedure we assume no ﬁxed-
effects and assume normality of the error terms. In that case we may provide results by
estimating equation (11) using a probit speciﬁcation, and then using the inverse mills ratio
to correct for self-selection in equation (9). As a result, in this case we provide estimates
under quite a standard parametric estimable equation. In contrast, when we provide es-
timates using the Kyriazidou procedure, we allow for ﬁxed effects both in the selection
and the intensive margin equations. In the case of the selection equation, we use a con-
ditional logit procedure while in the intensive margin equation, our estimates rely on a
semi-parametric methodology which allows us to drop the selection term out of equation
(9) to provide consistent estimates of that equation. Appendix (B) provides a detailed
discussion concerning the methodological procedure.
95 Data
5.1 Data description
The source of data in this paper is the Encuesta Nacional de Industrias Anual (Annual
National Survey of Industries in English, its Spanish acronym is ENIA). This is an annual
census of Chilean manufacturing ﬁrms which has been conducted yearly since 1979. Our
data ranges from 1979 to 2000. This survey is elaborated by the Chilean Instituto Nacional
de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics in English, its Spanish acronym is INE) at
the end of every year. The survey is collected on manufacturing ﬁrms and includes all
the ﬁrms with more than 10 employees -it does not consider plants that hired less than 10
employees or plants that have exited the market. Data contain detailed information of the
ﬁrms that compose the manufacturing sector at the 4-digit ISIC classiﬁcation. The survey
collects information on sales, investment, value added, employment and ﬁrm inputs.
The survey reports nominal variables, not real ﬁgures, and does not report plant level
output prices which would allow us to convert them. We constructed output prices to
generate constant price variables -see the Data Appendix for details about the deﬂators
used. That said, all the variables used in the empirical analysis are expressed in 1992
Chilean pesos.
As in Bergoeing, Hernando, and Repetto (2003), we excluded the information of plants
that report no employment, no blue-collar workers, zero wages, zero value added, gross
production value lesser than their value added, gross product sales lesser than their ex-
portation value, no ISIC code and negative value added. Moreover, to avoid the effect
of outliers in the estimation, ﬁrms with costs of capital in the lower and upper 2% of the
distribution were dropped. Similarly, we dropped the 3% of plants that reported outliers
on the variable investment to capital ratio.
Next we describe the way we constructed the main variables in our empirical anal-
ysis. The dependent variable in our analysis is the logarithm of capital stock. Capital
stock accounts for all types of capital. Our measure of corporate tax is denominated the
"Effective Corporate Tax". If the ﬁrm is involved in production, it corresponds to the ef-
fective amount of corporate tax paid by the ﬁrm divided by the ﬁrm’s value added. We
could instead have used the corporate tax rate set in the Chilean tax code, called the "First
Category Tax" which is an ad-valorem tax.5 However, since we have the effective amount
of corporate tax paid by ﬁrms available, we prefer to use it for two reasons. Firstly, some
5In other words, it is a percentage that applies on the net ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
10ﬁrmsmightevadecorporatetaxesandthustherealcorporatetaxratepaidbyﬁrmswould
differ from the tax set by the tax code. Secondly, the law allows to subtract past ﬁrm’s
losses from the current base used to calculate the corporate tax , as a way of providing
incentives to ﬁrms to remain in production when they incur that losses. In that case, a
ﬁrm might also face a smaller corporate tax rate than that set in the tax code. If the ﬁrm
is currently closed, we use the tax rate set in the Chilean code, i.e the "First Category Tax"
that affects the net proﬁts of ﬁrms as a measure of "Effective corporate Tax".
The variable "Interest rate" is calculated as the ratio of ﬁnancial expenses to value
added, and is a measure of the opportunity cost of investment. The variable "Deprecia-
tion rate" corresponds to the sum of depreciation on different types of capital (machinery,
cars, buildings, etc..) divided by the sum of the different types of capital stock. We also
construct other variables related to the ﬁrm’s characteristics. The variable "Firm’s Age"
represents the age of the ﬁrm in period t. It was assumed that while the ﬁrm is out of
the market, the ﬁrm does not get older because it does not operate, such that when the
ﬁrm reappears in the sample, it keeps the age it had in the last period before it decided to
exit. The variables "Size" are a series of dummy variables intended to capture the size of
the plant as a function of the number of individuals that the ﬁrm employs. The ﬁrst size
category corresponds to ﬁrms with the number of employees ranging between 10 and 19
workers, the second category corresponds to 20 to 49 workers, the third category to 50 to
99 workers, the fourth to 100 to 199 workers, the ﬁfth to 200 to 499 workers, the sixth to
500 to 999 workers and the seventh to 1000 or more workers.
Next, we describe additional variables included in the selection equation. As might be
obvious by now, the selection equation requires an indicator variable that signals when
the plant is producing and when it is not. This variable is "Participation" which is equal to
1iftheﬁrmwasparticipatinginthemarketthatyearand0otherwise. Itwasassumedthat
the ﬁrm was present if it reported employment data, because INE takes that information
into account when deciding whether to include that plant in the survey -for more details
about this, see Appendix (A).
In the estimation of the selection equation, we include similar variables in the invest-
ment equation but we also incorporate a couple of additional regressors: (1) the Herﬁnd-
ahl Index and (2) the Minimum Efﬁcient Scale. These additional regressors, which are
traditionally used in the industrial organization literature, were used by Görg and Strobl
(2003) in the study of plant survival. These variables act as exogenous instruments that af-
fect the participation decision but do not affect the investment decisions of ﬁrms involved
11in production (equation (9)).
The Herﬁndahl Index (HI) is a measure of a sub-sector ’s concentration and it is de-
ﬁned as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual ﬁrm. The effect
of market concentration on the entry decision could be positive if one thinks that a sub-
sector with a higher HI implies high margins, and could be negative if one suspects that
the competition is wild in that sub-sector.
The Minimum Efﬁcient Scale (MES) corresponds to median plant size in terms of em-
ployment, calculated for each industry at the 4-digit ISIC classiﬁcation (Revision 2) and
foreachyearofthesample. AccordingtoGörgandStrobl(2003), –andreferencestherein–,
this variable might be important to the entry/exit decision, but it might have an ambigu-
ousimpactonﬁrmsurvival. Oneargumentwhichwouldbeinlinewithanegativeimpact
of MES on plant survival is that small ﬁrms entering into industries with large MES might
not be able to attain the efﬁcient level of production and thus face a lower probability of
survival. Conversely, industries with large MES are generally associated with high mar-
gins (price minus cost), which would augment the likelihood of survival of entrant ﬁrms.
We also include some national aggregate control variables to capture changes at the
macroeconomic level that might affect the plants’ decision to invest. In addition, our
econometric estimations include foreign aggregate variables to control for external shocks
that might inﬂuence ﬁrms’ entry/exit decisions or their investment decisions.
Table (1) provides a summary of the deﬁnition of the variables while table (2) provides
summary statistics of the database. As can be seen in the table, there is a large dispersion
on the variables. In our sample new and old plants coexists. The mean payment of ﬁnan-
cial expenses on value added is large -almost 20% in our sample. Also approximately 18%
of plants in the sample are involved in production. The majority of plants correspond to
plants with size ranging from 20 to 200 workers.
INSERT TABLES (1) AND (2) ABOUT HERE
5.2 Raw data
To get a sense of the relation between corporate taxes and the creation of ﬁrms, we next
analyze some raw data concerning both variables.
Figure (1) shows the evolution of the presence of ﬁrms involved in production by year
(this is the variable participation in our data). The initial fraction involved in production
is quite low and drops by 1982 with the eruption of the 1982 ﬁnancial crisis. After 1985,
12and coinciding with a period of rapid growth in the Chilean economy, the fraction of ﬁrms
involved in production increased notably until reaching a peak of 22% by the end of 1996.
The eruption of the Asian crisis in 1997 decreased the fraction of ﬁrms involved in produc-
tion to its 1980’s level in a four year period. After 2000, and once the 1997 crisis was left
behind, ﬁrms’ participation increased once again. Figures (2) and (3) plot the evolution of
ﬁrm creation and destruction, respectively.6 In the ﬁgures, creation of ﬁrms corresponds
to the ﬁrms that were closed in period t ¡ 1 but are involved in production in period t
while, conversely, destruction corresponds to ﬁrms that were involved in production in
period t¡1 but are closed in period t. On the one hand, ﬁrms’ destruction is larger during
both the 1982 the 1997 economic crisis and is almost half of these crisis levels during the
expansionary period of 1985-1995. On the other hand, the creation of ﬁrms shows gen-
erally an upward trend with peaks in speciﬁc years, while there is also a period of lower
creation of ﬁrms after the eruption the 1997 economic crisis.
INSERT FIGURES (1) TO (3) ABOUT HERE
Figures (4) to (6) plot the same three series vis-µ a-vis effective corporate tax. The ﬁgures
show a considerable association between these variables: on the one hand, the larger the
corporate tax rate, the smaller the creation of ﬁrms and the fraction of ﬁrms involved in
production while on the other hand, the larger the corporate tax rate, the higher is ﬁrm
destruction. The ﬁgure concerning destruction of ﬁrms is not as clear as the other two
ﬁgures though, but there is still some correlation between the series.
INSERT FIGURES (4) TO (6) ABOUT HERE
These ﬁgures showed association between average time series variables. In addition,
to reinforce the graphical analysis, we run probit equations concerning the creation and
destruction of ﬁrms as a function of fundamentals, including the corporate tax rate. Tables
(3) and (4) are obtained using the complete data set and show the result from running the
probit regressions. The set of controls include the effective corporate tax rate, plus other
variables. Table (3) corresponds to regressions concerning the creation and destruction of
6The dummy variable "creation of ﬁrms" is equal to one when a ﬁrm was not involved in production in
year t-1 but it is involved in production in period t and it is equal to zero when a ﬁrm was not involved in
production in year t ¡ 1 and remains not involved in production in period t. In another hand, the dummy
variable "Destruction of ﬁrms" is equal to one when a ﬁrm was in production in period t ¡ 1 but it becomes
idle in period t while it is equal to zero when the ﬁrm was involved in production in period t ¡ 1 and it
remains involved in production in period t.
13ﬁrms. The ﬁrst three columns of the table correspond to the creation of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst
column of the table controls just for the effective tax rate. The second column includes
economic variables relating to the external scenario (terms of trade and the US industrial
index) while the third column includes in addition variables relating to the internal eco-
nomic cycle such as the output gap and the ﬁnancial intermediation ratio. The results
show that the coefﬁcient on the effective corporate tax rate is negative, signiﬁcant and
quite stable. Further, as shown at the bottom of the table, the marginal effect of the ef-
fective corporate tax rate is around -0.05 which means that a 1% increase in the effective
corporate tax rate should depress the creation of new ﬁrms by almost -0.05%. This effect
is quite considerable as the average rate of ﬁrm creation varies around 1% to 3%. The next
three columns of Table (3) show the result in the case of destruction of ﬁrms. These re-
gressions use data on ﬁrms that in period t-1 were involved in production. The marginal
impact of the effective corporate tax rate lies in between 0.1 and 0.52, being signiﬁcant
in all cases. In this case, a 1% increase in the effective corporate tax should increase ﬁrm
destruction by a number between 0.1% and 0.52%, which are also relevant numbers if
the consider that the average destruction of ﬁrms lies around 3% per year. Finally, table
(4) provides the result in the case of ﬁrms involved in production. The result concern-
ing the effective corporate tax rate is quite stable, being its marginal impact signiﬁcant
and around -1.2 which means that a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate should depress
the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production by 1.2%, which is also a strong result as the
average fraction of ﬁrms involved in production in our data set is 18.7%.
INSERT TABLES (3) AND (4) ABOUT HERE
6 Results and discussion
6.1 Results
We turn next to the results of the estimates obtained using the Heckman-Lee method
and the Kyriazidou method. As a benchmark for our posterior results we initially re-
port results from OLS and ﬁxed effects panel data methods. These estimations do not
correct for self selection and results are shown in Table (5). In the table, the ﬁrst column
presents the results when we include value added, the interest rate faced by the ﬁrm and
depreciation rate plus the effective corporate tax rate as regressors. These variables cor-
respond to the fundamentals in equation (5). Next, we include other aggregate variables
14that could also impact investment decisions, even when we keep the fundamentals in
equation (5)constant. In that spirit, the second column includes business cycle variables
while in the third column, rather than including business cycle variables, we include year
dummies as controls that should capture any aggregate change in the environment that
might impact investment decisions. As expected, value added has a positive and signiﬁ-
cant sign while the interest rate and the depreciation rate have a negative and signiﬁcative
coefﬁcient. The coefﬁcient on the effective corporate tax is not signiﬁcant. Columns 4 to
6 of table (5) present results for the FE panel data estimation. These results are consistent
with the OLS estimates.
INSERT TABLE (5) ABOUT HERE
Table (6) introduces the idea of potential selection on ﬁrms’ participation decision and
control for it by the use of the Heckman-Lee methodology. The table shows the same
three speciﬁcations. The initial speciﬁcations exclude either business cycle variables, size
dummies or year dummies. In the speciﬁcations, the second column corresponds to the
selection equation while the ﬁrst column corresponds to the intensive margin decision. In
the selection equation, we also report the marginal impact of the effective corporate tax
rate.
In our estimation of equation (9), as above, the variables value added, depreciation
rate and interest rate are signiﬁcant and have correct signs. In addition, the effective
corporate tax rate is also signiﬁcant and negative, as expected, and the point estimates
indicate that a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate would depress capital accumulation
by nearly 2% among ﬁrms already involved in production.
The estimates of the participation equation (11) show that the impact of the Herﬁndahl
index and the Minimum efﬁcient scale index on ﬁrm participation are positive and sig-
niﬁcant. As discussed above, the result that the coefﬁcients on the Herﬁndahl index and
the MES are positive may indicate that sub-sectors with larger HI or larger MES are also
sub-sectors with higher margins. The corporate tax rate has quite a signiﬁcant and stable
coefﬁcient. In fact, its marginal effect on ﬁrm participation is between [-1.2, -2] numbers
quite similar to the ones reported in table (4), and indicating that an increase of 1% in the
corporate tax rate would depress the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production by almost
1.2% and -2%. Finally, the coefﬁcient of the inverse of the mills-ratio is positive and signif-
icant, meaning that there is a positive correlation between unobservables in the selection
equation and the capital demand equation.
15INSERT TABLE (6) ABOUT HERE
Table (7) allows for ﬁxed effects in the estimations and relies on estimations obtained
using the procedure by Kyriazidou (1997). The selection (participation) equation was es-
timated by means of panel data ﬁxed effect logit method. We then present the estimates
concerning the selection and the intensive margin equation from the estimation of equa-
tion (9). The results are similar to those described in table (6). Two main differences that
appear in the table are (i) a smaller coefﬁcient on value added (that ranges in the prox-
imity of 0.3) and (ii) a negative coefﬁcient on the median scale variable in the selection
equation. The depreciation rate variable is signiﬁcant with correct sign, and the effec-
tive tax rate is negative and signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient of similar magnitude to those
reported in table (6), being in this case between [-0.58, -1.43].
INSERT TABLE (7) ABOUT HERE
Summing up, both methods that correct for self-selection in the ﬁrm’s decision to par-
ticipate in production show quite consistent results concerning the corporate tax. The
results show that the corporate tax rate has a signiﬁcant impact on both the ﬁrm’s par-
ticipation decision, as well as the capital stock accumulation decision for ﬁrms already
involved in production.
6.2 Discussion
We have shown using different methods that the corporate tax rate has two different im-
pacts on desired capital demand in the long run; on the one hand, it impacts the accu-
mulation of capital for ﬁrms involved in production while on the other hand, it impacts
the fraction of ﬁrms that might be involved in production. The sum of both effects might
have a considerable impact on the long run capital stock of the economy as can be seen in
ﬁgure (7). The ﬁgure shows the aggregate capital demand of the economy, which is equal
to the sum of capital demands for all the ﬁrms in the economy.
INSERT FIGURE (7) ABOUT HERE
As shown in the ﬁgure, the higher is the tax rate the larger could be the user cost
of capital that each ﬁrm faces, indicated by the movement from º1 to º2 in the ﬁgure.7
7Unless tax deductions arising from depreciation or debt and interest-rate payments were large enough to
offset that effect.
16As a result, if there were no change in the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production, the
new equilibrium would be at º¤
2 and hence the capital stock would be depressed to K¤
2.
However, as shown in our results, the larger is the corporate tax, the smaller is the fraction
of ﬁrms involved in production. As such, the aggregate capital stock demand switches
from Kd
1 to Kd
2 and the negative impact on capital stock is augmented and we end up
with capital stock at K¤¤
2 .
Howlargecouldthese effectsbe? Followingourdiscussion insection(3), let’ssuppose
ln(²) is distributed according to a cumulative distributionG(²) with support [²l;²u], where





where cit is deﬁned as in (7). Note that an increase in the corporate tax rate would














where Scit is the fraction of capital stock in hands of the ﬁrm in the margin between
production and remaining idle. Expression (13) indicates that the impact on aggregate
capital depends on (i) the intensive margin effect, which impacts ﬁrms in production, and
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17their capital stock holdings.
In economies where the ﬁrms at the margin hold a small fraction of capital stock, the
impact of corporate taxation on capital stock arises mainly through the intensive margin
effect, which would be in line with the general view in the literature. However, even in
that case, our approach would be useful. As we have seen above, if we neglect the exten-
sive margin mechanism in the empirical approach the estimates of the relevant effect (the
intensive margin) could be biased. On the other hand, in economies in which the ﬁrm at
the margin holds a considerable share of the capital stock, the importance of the extensive
margin effect is twofold: (i) it allows for unbiased estimation of the effects and (ii) it gives
an estimate of the impact of corporate taxation on the capital stock quite different than the
usual intensive margin effect.
7 Conclusions
There is a large literature on the empirical analysis of capital stock and investment at the
ﬁrm level. We provide another vision to that problem. Firstly, we focus on the impact
of corporate taxation. Generally, the literature focuses on Tobin’s q or on the user-cost as
main determinants of investment. Obviously, corporate taxation is one of the components
of Tobin’s q and of a ﬁrm’s user cost and therefore one would be able to determine the
impact of corporate taxation by identifying the respective effects on a ﬁrm’s investment.
In our case, we focus on disentangle the effect of corporate taxation directly, through the
use of a reduced form equation obtained from a setup similar to the traditional user cost
of capital but in which we allow for the entry and exit of ﬁrms.
We follow this identiﬁcation strategy because we observe a large variation in corpo-
rate taxation and in ﬁrm creation and destruction that might allow us to disentangle the
impacts. Secondly, we incorporate the idea of creation and destruction of ﬁrms into the
empirical analysis of investment determinants and note that, if we not consider that deci-
sion, we might obtain biased estimates. In this context, corporate taxation plays a crucial
role as it impacts both the decision to participate in production and the investment deci-
sion of ﬁrms that have already decided to produce.
Our empirical exercise shows in fact that if we do not correct for self selection, the
coefﬁcient of corporate tax in the intensive margin decision is not signiﬁcant. However
when we correct for self selection either by the Heckman-Lee method or the Kyriadizou
method, the coefﬁcient becomes negative and signiﬁcant as expected. In both methods
18the intensive margin impact is economically signiﬁcant, as we ﬁnd that a 1% increase in
corporate tax might depress capital stock accumulation by between 1 and 2%.
A second result is that the impact of corporate taxation on a ﬁrm’s decision to become
involved in production is large; in fact our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in cor-
porate tax rate might depress the participation of ﬁrms by almost 1.2% . In that sense,
the impact of corporate taxation on aggregate investment does not arise simply from the
impact on ﬁrms’ decision to invest but mainly through the decrement in the number of
ﬁrms involved in production, which depresses aggregate investment even if investment
per ﬁrm remains relatively constant.
19A Data Appendix
We describe next the construction of some of our data.
Deﬂators:
ENIA does not report plant level output prices, so they must be constructed to gener-
ate constant price variables. We used the 3 digit ISIC level deﬂator from INE’s wholesale
price indices, elaborated by Bergoeing, Hernando, and Repetto (2003). For robustness
purposes, an alternative measure of deﬂators was built based on Yagui (1989). We then
constructed a 4 digit ISIC level deﬂator, equal to a weighted average of 7 digit ISIC level
product prices, using as weights the value added of the respective product at the 4 digits
ISIC classiﬁcation sub-sector over the whole manufacturing sector.
Capital Stock:
ENIA contains three kinds of capital: structures, vehicles and machinery. However, it
only reports them since 1992. Therefore, for prior years, the capital series must be con-
structed. For that purpose, capital was built based on Bergoeing, Hernando, and Repetto
(2003). First of all, investment must be generated. ENIA reports several forms of invest-
ment: purchases, sales, repairs and own production. Thus, investment expenditure in







where I stands for investment, P represents real purchases of capital n, S is real sales of
capital n, R corresponds to real repairs and reforms made to the capital n and O stands for
real capital of type n produced by the plant itself for its own beneﬁt. All the real variables
are expressed in 1992 Chilean pesos.
Once the investment series are obtained, capital series can be constructed. However,
the process is less direct than it seems because ﬁrms enter and exit the sample constantly,
which creates the unbalanced nature of this panel. To deal with this issue, an algorithm
was elaborated, using investment and depreciation for the three types of capital. The
algorithm is:
1. If the plant was present during the whole period from 1979 to 1992, the law of mo-







j;t is the stock of capital n in period t accumulated by the plant j and ¢n
j;t
stands for the depreciation value of stock of capital n, for period t accumulated by
plant j.
2. If the ﬁrm enters and exits repeatedly in the period 1979 to 1992, the previous step
was implemented until the plant disappears at some point between 1979 and 1992.
If the ﬁrm reappears early in the past, a regression was implemented to estimate the
capital stock. Thus, the regression estimated was:
kn
j;t = ¯0 + ¯1yj;t + ¯1lj;t + ²n
j;t
which is a reduced form of a Cobb-Douglas production function.9 yj;t is the value
added by plant j in year t, lj;t is the total number of employees hired by plant j in
year t, and ²n
j;t is a random perturbation. The regression above was estimated for
each type of capital, for each year from 1979 to 1991 and for each sub-sector at the 4-
digit ISIC level, capturing the heterogeneity and the dynamic of the manufacturing
sector and minimizing any aggregation effect. So, the capital stock was estimated
using data on employment and value added of the missing capital stock ﬁrms, along
with the estimates obtained. If, in a given year, the plant did not report data needed
to estimate the regression above or if the ﬁrm did not reappear early in the past
within the sample, no capital stock was estimated for that plant that year.
National Aggregate variables:
We also include some national aggregate control variables to capture changes at the
macroeconomic level that might affect the plants’ decision to invest. Some of these vari-
ables deal with domestic cycles and ﬁnancial sector development. The "Output-gap" is the
difference between the actual real GDP and the potential output, which is measured based
on the de-trended GDP, calculated using the Hodrik-Prescott ﬁlter. This variable controls
for the cyclical movements of output and investment. For the econometric implementa-
tion, a one period lag of this variable is used to avoid endogeneity issues. The variable
"FIR" -Financial Intermediation Ratio- is the sum of bank deposits, mortgage debts and
market value of stocks as a fraction of GDP. The source of this series is Díaz, Luders, and
Wagner (2008). This variable is a proxy of ﬁnancial development.
Foreign Aggregate variables:
9Hereafter, a lowercase letter means a natural logarithm of that variable.
21In addition, our econometric estimations include foreign aggregate variables to con-
trol for external shocks that might inﬂuence ﬁrms’ entry/exit decision or their investment
decisions. These variables might have an important inﬂuence if we consider the fact that
the sample is composed of many manufacturing plants involved in the tradable sector.
Those inﬂuences are not captured by other included variables, so they must be incorpo-
rated. The variables intended to capture the foreign business cycle are the "US Industrial
Production Index" and the "Chilean Terms of Trade".
B Methodological Appendix
B.1 Heckman-Lee method
We will assume initially that there are no individual effects in the system (9)-(11). In that
case, potential correlation between the participation equation and equation (9) arises only
through exogenous variables and through correlation between uit and ¹it. In this case,
our estimations are based upon:
ln(kit) = xit¯ + ¹it if zit° + uit ¸ 0 (A-1)
Following the traditional analysis in Heckman (1974), Heckman (1976), Lee (1978) and
Lee (1983), we may write (A-1) as:
ln(kit) = xit¯ + E¹ [¹itjuit > ¡zit°] + $is
where $is = E¹ [¹itjuit > ¡zit°] ¡ ¹it. Further, given the distributional properties of
(¹it;uit), we get the estimable equation -using Heckman’s control function:








¾u . Note that in (A-2) correlation between uit and ¹it is controlled by
the term ¾¹u while the set zit might include xit, providing another source of correlation
between both equations, which is accounted for by the control function dit. As it is usual
22in the application of this methodology, see Görg and Strobl (2003), we include in zit at
least one variable not included in xit to improve identiﬁcation.
B.2 Panel data analysis - Kyriazidou Procedure
Next, we will allow for individual effects in our estimations. Note that the conditional
expectation of ¹it given the selection decision -which is the idea behind the inverse of
the ratio mills in the Heckman-Lee method - now depends on the distributional prop-
erties of (uit;®i). Unlike the Heckman-Lee method, this conditional expectation cannot
be computed from simple probit regressions and usually requires two-dimensional nu-
merical integration to incorporate the distributional properties of (uit;®i). Verbeck and
Nijman (1996) discuss the use of two control functions in the second step to account for
the problem or the use of a maximum likelihood estimator for a random probit model
with selection bias.
In our case, to correct for self selection, we will follow the procedure proposed by
Kyriazidou (1997). This procedure, rather than using numerical integration, focuses on
time differencing the data to remove the individual ﬁxed effects while controlling for the
sample selection. Applications of this method are Charlier, Melenberg, and van Soest
(2001) and Askildsen, Baltagi, and Holmas (2003).
To consistently estimate our parameter of interest, the procedure relies on time differ-
encing the capital demand equation, (9), for those observations in which dis = dit = 1;t 6=
s and for which there are data available.
ln(ki;t) ¡ ln(ki;s) = (xit ¡ xis)¯ + (E¹ [¹itjdit = 1;³i] ¡ E¹ [¹isjdis = 1;³i]) (A-3)
where ³i = (xit;zit;xis;zis;®i;´i). This step allows us to remove the individual ﬁxed
effect but the sample-selection might still be present and in equation (A-3) it corresponds
to the term (E¹ [¹itjdit = 1;³i] ¡ E¹ [¹isjdis = 1;³i]). Note that this term will be equal to
zero if (1) the joint distribution of the error terms is time invariant and (2) zit° = zis°.
Thus, if we were able to apply ﬁrst differences to equation (9) when dis = dit = 1;t 6= s
and zit° = zis°;t 6= s, we could remove both the individual ﬁxed effect and the sample
selection bias.
In general, zit° 6= zis°;t 6= s, thus it might not be possible to apply the procedure. To
bypass the problem, Kyriazidou (1997) proposes to weigh the observations to give more
23importance to those observations for which zit° and zis° are close.
To make the estimator operational , we follow the next steps. Firstly, we estimate
equation (11) by a conditional logit model and we obtain consistent estimates °n. Sec-
ondly, using these estimates, we construct the weights on (zit ¡ zis)°n, and calculate the









b ªi(xit ¡ xis)0(yit ¡ yis)ditdis
#
(A-4)






are"kernel"weights, thatdeclinetozeroasj(zit ¡ zis)°nj
increases and hn is a sequence of bandwidths with the property limn!1hn = 0.
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34Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Investment Equation Variables
ln( Capital) 11.48 1.922 -0.500 22.036
Firms’ Age 5.157 5.026 1.000 25.000
Corporate Tax 0.219 0.152 0.000 0.510
Size 1 0.002 0.045 0.000 1.000
Size 2 0.044 0.204 0.000 1.000
Size 3 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000
Size 4 0.025 0.157 0.000 1.000
Size 5 0.015 0.122 0.000 1.000
Size 6 0.010 0.100 0.000 1.000
Size 7 0.002 0.049 0.000 1.000
Size 8 0.001 0.024 0.000 1.000
Selection Equation Variables
Participation 0.187 0.390 0.000 1.000
Herﬁndahl Index 0.004 0.044 0.000 1.000
Minimum Efﬁcient Scale 38.781 39.395 9.000 1565.000
National Aggregate Variables
Output Gap -533186.600 2076308.000 -3327422.000 3451314.000
Financial Intermediation Ratio 105.384 45.646 38.110 179.480
Foreign Aggregate Variables
Industrial Production Index 54582.030 29494.320 11637.200 99998.000
Federal Funds Rate 6.738 3.628 1.130 16.380
Standard errors in parentheses.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4: Firms involved in production
1(Participation) 1(Participation) 1(Participation)
Effective Corporate Tax -6.48550*** -6.39517*** -6.47176***
(0.00489) (0.00491) (0.00491)
US Index -0.00001*** -0.00000***
(0.00000) (0.00000)






Constant -0.05653*** -0.48152*** -2.39952***
(0.00264) (0.01120) (0.03618)
Observations 405782 392043 392043
Pseudo R2 0.342 0.351 0.362
Chi2 135729 132850 137014
log-L. -1.30492e+05 -1.23038e+05 -1.20956e+05
Marginal effect
Effective Corporate Tax -1.145175 *** -1.26547*** -1.284843***
Standard errors in parentheses.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 6: Heckman-Lee method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(Capital) 1(in) log(Capital) 1(in) log(Capital) 1(in)
Log(value added) 0.78241*** 0.78222*** 0.77530***
(0.00457) (0.00457) (0.00446)
Effective Corporate tax -2.53399*** -10.97550*** -2.02057*** -10.97550*** -1.75955*** -11.55356***
(0.24691) (0.02411) (0.27162) (0.02411) (0.23249) (0.02364)
depreciation rate -0.02630*** -0.02632*** -0.02707***
(0.00394) (0.00393) (0.00390)
Interest rate -0.02462*** -0.02475*** -0.02481***
(0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00166)
Year Dummies YES YES
Firm’s age 0.00894*** 0.12434*** 0.00666*** 0.12434*** 0.00410* 0.12516***
(0.00185) (0.00108) (0.00197) (0.00108) (0.00167) (0.00113)
Size Dummies YES YES YES
Business Cycle YES YES YES YES
Median Scale 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 0.00100***
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00016)
Herﬁndahl Index 1.29226*** 1.29226*** 1.19315***
(0.11798) (0.11798) (0.12111)
Inverse ratio Mills 0.27780*** 0.23617*** 0.20336***
(0.02589) (0.02851) (0.02356)
Marginal Impact Corporate tax -2.637539*** -2.637539*** -1.24348***
Observations 161709 161709 161709 161709 165346 165346
Chi-squared 350955 350955 357931 357931 387268 387268
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
39Table 7: Kyriadizou Procedure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(Capital) 1(in) log(Capital) 1(in) log(Capital) 1(in)
Log(value added) 0.42666*** 0.34712*** 0.31678***
(0.00948) (0.01057) (0.01048)
Effective Corporate tax -0.58136* -15.41773*** -1.43471*** -6.68508*** -0.95909*** -6.78078***
(0.22915) (0.13155) (0.24036) (0.13127) (0.25073) (0.11687)
depreciation rate -0.08643*** -0.08610*** -0.08456***
(0.01367) (0.01358) (0.01338)
Interest rate -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00002
(0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00105)
Firm’s age -0.25827*** 0.01390*** -0.06744*** 0.04131*** -0.00295
(0.00416) (0.00127) (0.00795) (0.00193) (0.00719)
Size Dummies YES YES
Business Cycle YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Median Scale -0.02685*** -0.00767*** -0.00269*
(0.00076) (0.00111) (0.00109)
Herﬁndahl Index 0.96621 1.70374* 1.43558
(0.62415) (0.80503) (0.77774)
Observations 27515 141638 27515 133069 27515 141638
Log-Likelihood -40006.23 -30253.95 -39742.08 -14840.82 -39170.19 -16225.39
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
40